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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Maynard E. Pirsig: Idealism in the Service
of Judicial Administration
Charles W. Wolfram*
On the occasion of Professor Maynard E. Pirsig's retire-
ment from the active teaching of law, it is particularly fitting
for several reasons that some note be taken of his work in the
field of judicial administraton. He originated the course in ju-
dicial administration in 19341 at the beginning of his academic
career as a member of the University of Minnesota Law School
faculty. From this subject developed much that in the course of
time has led to a national reputation for him in at least five other
fields of legal service and scholarship-civil procedure, legal
ethics, juvenile corrections, criminal. law and arbitration. In
addition, to take his measure in only cne of these fields offers the
best hope of doing justice to some part of his work within the
scope of the present piece. Moreover, because of our shared
interests in judicial administration problems and because I have
recently had the good fortune to be able to sit in on the last
classes that Professor Pirsig will teach in judicial administration,
my credentials will be least suspect in that area.
The relatively short overlap of our respective tenures will
confine me to the Maynard Pirsig that his students and some of
his colleagues knew best-his published writings and his class-
room lectures. I am thus unable, because of the incompleteness
of my information, to canvass adequately the very great public
service contributions, most of which have eluded publication,
that Professor Pirsig has made to the ongoing task of improving
the administration of justice.
In the almost 40 years that Professor Pirsig has labored
at the Law School, during which time he has known almost
every graduate in one or another of his classes, he has produced
an amount of scholarship that could only laboriously and pre-
maturely be reduced to a bibliographby. It would be laborious
because it would necessarily encompass, on a rough count, eight
new or substantially revised editions of books, some 16 full-
length articles, a number of monographs, several published sym-
posium papers, and literally dozens of reviews. In addition,
there is the great deal of his writings that has seen the light
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. See M. PiRsiG, CASES ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION viii (1946).
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of day under comparatively anonymous authorships-from the
opinions in 18 cases on the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
voluminous commentary prepared as Reporter for what became
the 1963 Minnesota Criminal Code,2 his writings as a Conmis-
sioner of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, as a member of the advisory Committee on Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the federal district courts, as a member
of the Governor's Crime Commission, and much more. That
the preparation of a bibliography would be premature is proved
by the fact that Professor Pirsig has at least two substantial
works known to be in manuscript 3 and doubtless will now re-
double scholarly efforts that in the past have led to the compila-
tion of one of the most significant records of scholarly production
that Minnesota has ever witnessed. It is this assurance of con-
tinuing contributions from Professor Pirsig and the realization
that a respite from heavy teaching responsibilities has been so
well earned, that leads on balance to our welcoming his retire-
ment.
In the preparation of this brief appreciation of Professor
Pirsig's work in the field of judicial administration, his pub-
lished writings and my notes of his class meetings have been re-
viewed with an eye to presenting the "essential" Pirsig. As
this review progressed and as I attended Professor Pirsig's
classes, however, an apprehension developed. It began to appear
as if my previous notions of the types of problems to which a
study of judicial administration would be addressed were really
not shared by him in some important particulars. These differ-
ences seemed to center in the task of constructing at least zones
of white, gray and black to divide the subject matter of judicial
administration from that of legal ethics and jurisprudence on
the one hand and from that of civil and criminal procedure and
evidence on the other. The division would be necessary for my
present purpose, because, among other things, Maynard Pirsig
had also established widely recognized expertise in the field of
legal ethics and civil procedure and I certainly did not want to
take on more of the task of attempting to comprehend the man
than I already had. After some thought and a bit of rearranging
did little to dispel the apparent differences, my thought was to
let the matter go and do without a common definition. But the
problem of scope and definition continued to gnaw. Only slowly
2. See 40 MAnx. STAT. ANN. x (1964).




did it occur to me that much more might be at stake than is
typically involved in a theoretician's attempt to impose an arti-
ficial discipline upon intractable materials. What perhaps best
crystallized the issue was encountering the following two state-
ments, neither by Professor Pirsig, but each said in review of
his casebook on judicial administration:4 "Fundamentally the
concern of judicial administration is to create statesmen out of
judges and lawyers. . ."5 and
[tihis reviewer notes the absence of materials on a number
of administrative topics, such as court budgets, the collection
of fines and costs, expenditures, accounts, bail-bond practices,
and other financial matters; the selection, classification and
control of the subordinate personnel of the courts; dockets, rec-
ords, and administrative reports; court libraries and research
facilities; the provision of competent personal assistants for thejudges; and court rooms and equipment .... 6
Plainly enough, each reviewer is speaking to a different issue.
But it is also fairly apparent that were the two writers each
asked to classify the core concerns of judicial administration they
would, if I may take their isolated statements as sufficient proof,
take similarly widely varying viewpoints-the former largely
idealized, the latter more mechanistic.
Fuller reflection prompts me to offer the former of these
attitudes-the idealized, perhaps some would say the romantic,
philosophy-as the essential character in Maynard Pirsig's 40
years and more of service to the administration of justice. States-
man-like, he has sought throughout to lead the judicial system by
degrees, away from the barbarisms of its past, toward the fuller
realization of its potential utility as a powerful force for decency.
The search for improvements in the administration of justice has
led him to the exploration of virtually any legal topic so long as it
had some impact upon the way that 'lawyers and courts behave.
The inquiry could lead to such apparently disparate subjects as
the rules of evidence and of civil procedure,7 the quality of educa-
tion in the law schools,8 many of the aspects of administrative
law,9 and the like. While perhaps somewhat haphazard as a
4. M. Prest, supra note 1. Garner, Book Review, 60 HARV. L. REV.
680 (1947), cautioned that ... [T]he specific gravity of the volume
is very high ......
5. Taylor, Book Review, 42 Nw. U.L. REv. 410, 411 (1947).
6. Anderson, Book Review, 41 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 367, 368 (1947).
7. See, e.g., M. PmsiG, supra note 1, ch. 4. Professor Pirsig's
independent work in civil procedure is perhaps best represented by his
two-volume text M. PiRsiG, MIMNESOTA PLEADING (rev. 4th ed. 1956).
8. See M. PiRsiG, supra note 1, at 865-902.
9. Id. at 80-165.
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"science," this conception of judicial administration as the entree
to virtually any legal subject reflected more the initial and con-
tinuing instincts of a man whose humaneness is his most basic
attribute.
Aspects of Professor Pirsig's early professional life sug-
gest the sources of this instinct. From a time soon after his
graduation from law school, Professor Pirsig was closely asso-
ciated with the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis and practiced
rather extensively in local courts in behalf of impecunious cli-
ents. Forty years later, his memories of the treatment of his
legal aid clients at the hands of a sometimes quite unsympathetic
judicial system made a vivid impression on students whose social
instincts, despite their youthful exquisiteness, were no more
sensitive than his own. A second aspect will also be familiar to
Professor Pirsig's students of judicial administration. During
the early 1930's, he spent a happy and well-remembered year in
London as clerk in the office of a solicitor. While quick to point
out the defects in the solicitor-barrister arrangement of the Eng-
lish bar, Professor Pirsig also seemed to have carried away from
his exposure a profound respect for the traditions of profession-
alism of the English bar. He has stated explicitly that the
largely superior judicial system in England-with much less
time, delay, cost, and more professional and public confidence in
the results-is owed in large measure to the bar's habits and
traditions. This could well have had a pervasive effect upon
Professor Pirsig's future thinking about problems of judicial ad-
ministration. For one under these influences, the problem of
the improvement of the judicial system could become largely
a problem of the improvement of the moral attitudes of the bar
and the judiciary. Profoundly impressed with what he had expe-
rienced, he returned to his native state and has spent the inter-
vening years of his professional career attempting to build a simi-
lar tradition, with a similarly just and expeditious judicial
system.
Thus, perhaps, has it also come about that Maynard Pirsig
has been acknowledged as an authority in both judicial adminis-
tration and professional responsibility or "legal ethics." For
Pirsig, as for others, the study of the workings of the judicial
process leads inexorably, at some time or another, into a study
of the role to be played by the lawyer in that system. This
absorption of the scholar of judicial administration in the prob-
lems of professional responsibility is demonstrated in a graphic
way by the 1949 printing of Cases on Judicial Administration
19701
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which contains as an appendix the collection of cases and mate-
rials that eventually appeared in a separate and expanded form
in his 1957 work, Cases and Materials on the Standards of the
Legal Profession. The author was careful in the latter work to
point out, however, that this apparent divorce was dictated only
by considerations of curricular convenience and was not to be
taken as an indication that the study of matters of professional
responsibility could be substituted for a course in judicial ad-
ministration.'"
Here, I think, lies the nub of what Pirsig believed to be
the judicial system; here too is the point of greatest contrast
between the "classical" thinking about the judicial system and
modem, "systemic" thinking. For the classical mind-and for
this purpose I would rank together such otherwise hardly com-
patible persons as Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank and Maynard
Pirsig-the ultimate answers to the :problems thought to beset
the judicial process were to be found in its personnel. At bot-
tom, it was the judges and lawyers that manned the system
that determined how well it would work. Perhaps as a result
of this concentration, I believe it fair to say that Professor Pirsig
disliked, and thus never fully came to grips with, the more
mundane and technical problems of judicial administration.
Not, of course, that he ignored them; in fact, there is a chapter
on some problems of the mechanics of judicial administration
in his casebook. 11 But that is just the point: one chapter out of
eight, and at that a chapter that he typically did not assign or
discuss.
In Professor Pirsig's classroom the emphasis upon the hu-
man elements in judicial administration was almost total. Such
things as the mechanical operation of a local court system were
completely ignored. Nor was it simply a question of an alloca-
tion of emphasis made necessary by the lack of sufficient time
to cover all desired materials; for the words themselves made
clear that most problems of judicial administration were simply
a matter of educating the profession and instilling a will to re-
form. Easy steps lead from this concern with the role of lawyers
in the adjudicatory process to their larger roles in advising cli-
ents and performing other out-of-court functions. In this area
-variously called "professional responsibility" or "legal ethics"
10. M. PIRSIG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE STANDARDS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION xi (1957).
11. M. PmsiG, supra note 1, ch. 5.
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-Pirsig attained his most recent and perhaps his most enduring
fame.
Whatever else by way of the intrinsic persuasiveness of his
exposition has made Professor Pirsig an authority on matters
of judicial administration, certainly a major contributing factor
was his service during 1942 as an associate justice of the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota.12 His service as a temporary asso-
ciate justice was necessitated chiefly by the exigent state of the
court's docket at the time. Although he served for only three
months at the end of the 1942 Term of the court, during that
time he doubtless became much more aware of the workings
and limitations of the appellate judicial system. At the same
time he rendered 11 majority, three specially concurring and
four dissenting opinions, some of which have become standards
in their respective substantive fields.13 In addition, a number
of his opinions reflect concern with appropriate appellate proce-
dure and the relative roles of appellate and trial courts, persis-
tent problems of appellate judicial administration. 4
Justice Pirsig was by no means a timid judge. In fact, his
first official words were filed by way of a dissenting opinion.15
This temperament of judicial independence was maintained
throughout his tenure as attested, among other things, by his
three special concurrences and four dissents. Of the 88 cases
in which he cast votes, he registered six dissents and four special
concurrences.
The topic most likely to stimulate dissent from Justice Pirsig
was that of the proper functioning of an appellate court vis-A-vis
12. Pirsig was appointed associate justice of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court on October 6, 1942, to serve out the term of Associate
Justice Royal A. Stone. Justice Stone had died before the end of his
regular six-year term of office but after he and four other candidates
had filed for the 1942 election. See Enger v. Holm, 213 Minn. 154, 156,
6 N.W.2d 101, 102 (1942). Justice Pirsig was not, of course, among
the candidates. His term expired at the beginning of the 1943 Term of
the supreme court on January 4, 1943.
13. Undoubtedly the most famous of these was Justice Pirsig's
opinion for the majority in State v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 213 Minn.
395, 7 N.W.2d 691 (1942), affd by a divided Court, 322 U.S. 292(1944).
14. See note 15 infra.
15. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 213 Minn. 140, 145, 6 N.W.2d 47, 50 (1942).
In a "political" case in which he was clearly right on the law but
apparently on the wrong side of the politics, Justice Pirsig rejected the
notion that O'Brien's designation of himself on his certificate of nomina-




the trial courts. 16 Herein is something to be learned of his judi-
cial administration thinking as applied to appellate courts. Ba-
sically, his position in dissent in these cases was that the trial
courts must, of necessity, be entrusted with the day-to-day oper-
ation of the judicial system and that attempts by an appellate
court to intrude their judgment on matters of no pervasive im-
portance and upon which legitimate differences of opinion could
exist would seriously undermine the working authority of the
trial courts and place the appellate courts in the position of sec-
ond-guessing the legion of trial judges on a myriad of issues.
This attitude of relative restraint in reversing trial judges was
paralleled by another dissent in which Justice Pirsig objected
to the majority's insistence that an administrative body follow
the analogy of judicial procedure with respect to giving notice
to a person about to be affected by a proposed ruling.' 7 For
many administrative purposes, methods may be appropriate that
differ from those employed in the judicial process, notwithstand-
ing their strangeness to traditional judges.
The lessons thus learned from life and in varied careers in
the law were all focused in what an observer feels was the
major occasion of Professor Pirsig's day, the class meeting with
his students. For the student subjected in other classes to the
perhaps nagging demands of the Socratic method rigidly applied,
the class meetings with Professor Pirsig must have seemed like
calm respite from a storm. Here the emphasis was not upon the
elaborately reasoned development of doctrine-although sloppy
thinking was always mildly reproved. Instead, the inquiry was
almost always normative: based upon the descriptive materials
assigned for the hour, how should the system be improved?
Professor Pirsig's classroom analysis was generally initiated by
his recounting a personal experience from his wealth of memo-
ries of recent and past controversies in the administration of
justice followed by a challenge to his students to devise a better
method. The ultimate insistence was for a scheme of solutions
that would more nearly approach an ideal accomodation of de-
cency and efficiency. The approach was designed to emphasize
and develop innovative and "legislative" skills. This doubtless
reflected in part a belief that reforms in the legal system must
largely come from agencies other than courts operating in their
16. The best of this genre is Justice Pirsig's dissent in Czanstkowski
v. Matter, 213 Minn. 257, 267, 6 N.W.2d 629, 634 (1942).
17. Juster Bros., Inc. v. Christgau, 214 Minn. 108, 122, 7 N.W.2d
501, 509 (1943).
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narrow judicial capacity in the decision of individual cases, al-
though the operation of courts in their rule-making and ad-
ministrative capacities were often encouraged as alternatives.
The hope, one gathered, was that students thus equipped with
a challenging attitude, a reformer's zeal for ideal solutions, and
a full arsenal of possibilities for innovation would continue to
confront the judicial system with the challenges to ever more
humane conduct that alone will guarantee its continuing legiti-
macy.
Scholar, public servant, teacher, judge-in all of these ca-
pacities Professor Maynard E. Pirsig has served as a preeminent
spokesman for humanity and decency in the administration of
justice. His teaching will be missed at the University of Minne-
sota Law School, but the example that he continues to set in the
work of improving the system of justice will remain as constant
as ever in what is destined to be a very active retirement.

